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As an issue affecting the foreign relations of the
United States and Britain, impressment has been given
varying emphasis by different authors.

This thesis is

first a chronological outline of the events and
correspondence that trace the subject.

Beyond this basic
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delineation I will consider exactly how important
impressment was to the two countries.

James F. Zimmerman,

in Impressment of American Seamen, posits that impressment
was of paramount significance while other authors have
attempted to down grade it into a status of utter
inconsequence.

This paper will show that the actual

influence of impressment varied from one time, one set of
circumstances, to another.

Finally, my thesis will attempt

to show more of the British side of the question,
heretofore primarily ignored.

It will be shown that

members of the British government had what they felt to be
perfectly valid reasons for continuing the practice, even
though it eventually led to war.
Chapter one serves as an introduction and explanation
of the legal and historical backgrounds of impressment.
The chapter also covers the first difficulties the two
countries had over the issue, when England and France
nearly went to war in 1787.

These would serve as a model

for the problems to come.
Chapter two looks into the reasons behind the need for
impressment and America's argument against it.

Britain

needed men to man the navy, America needed these same men
for its merchant marine, out of this the basic conflict was
born.
Chapter three deals with American efforts to contain
or eliminate impressment, mostly through acts of Congress

3

to protect United States sailors.

The problem America had

with issuing proofs of citizenship and Britain's
requirement that America issue them began to bring
impressment to the fore.

James Monroe was sent to London

for talks of which impressment was to be a major topic.
Chapter four covers the parallel careers of Monroe,
United States envoy to London, and Anthony Merry, British
minister to America.

Both men had troubles dealing with

what they felt were obstinate foreign governments and both
mens' missions were, in the end, failures.

Merry, feeling

America to be inflating the reaction against impressment,
paid little attention to the complaints and ended up having
to deal with harsh anti-British legislation.

Monroe's lack

of success took longer and forms the basis of chapter five.
This chapter details how the Jefferson administration and
Monroe were incapable of getting Britain to give an inch on
the subject.

This culminated in the Treaty of 1806, which

was silent on impressment.
Chapter six shows how this lack of action set the
stage for the encounter between the Chesapeake and the
Leopard.

This skirmish almost led to war and represents

the peak of impressment's importance as an issue in foreign
affairs.
Chapter seven details other differences between the
two countries as they slid toward the War of 1812.
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Impressment was but one of many causes of the conflict,
though one which both sides contributed to keeping alive.
Finally, chapter eight covers war-time diplomacy and
shows how impressment quickly became the only subject the
two countries were fighting over.

Later actions on

America's part reveal that impressment, as a single
complaint, was no longer considered a war-worthy topic, or
even much of a cause for complaint.
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CHAPTER I
LEGAL BEGINNINGS, 1787-1795
In the years following United States independence,
maritime concerns dominated the young nation's relations
with Great Britain.

As they vied in the commercial arena,

questions of the carrying trade and neutral rights helped
push the two countries apart.

Yet nothing, it seems, was

quite as divisive as the problem of impressmento
Impressment, as it was called, was the primary method Great
Britain had for staffing its navy.

In this early

non-democratic form of the draft men were simply snatched
up and forced into service on British ships of war.
American citizens were often mistakenly taken in these
roundups due to similarities between the nationalities and
a lack of adequate proofs of American citizenship.

At

first a seemingly innocuous difficulty, the problem
persisted through the terms of four American presidents,
defying resolution, heightening other antagonisms and
eventually leading to war.
This thesis provides a narrative of the impressment
dispute from its origins in 1787 to its somewhat
inconclusive resolution in 1818.

James Zimmerman addressed

the issue in Impressment of American Seamen, published in
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1912.

Yet Zimmerman overrated the importance of

impressment as a factor in international relations while
disregarding issues relating to boundaries and payments on
loans made before the war.

Zimmerman also ignored the

British side of the controversy.

This thesis will show

that both America and Britain shared responsibility for the
emerging controversy.

The combination of a large British

navy and a growing American merchant force made the
impressment dilemma a virtual certainty.
Impressment as a method of staffing the Royal Navy
went back so far even the British had no idea of its
origins.

In 1771, Sir William Blackstone, of His Majesty's

legal force, spoke of the "right" as existing in less than
certain terms:
It hath very clearly ... been shewn by sir Michael
Foster, that the practice of impressing ... is of
very antient date, and hath been uniformly continued
by a regular series of precedents to the present
time ... The difficulty arises ... that no statute
has expressly declared this power to be in the
crown ... This method of impressing ... is only
defensible from public necessity, to which all
private considerations must give way. 1
The main legal standing for impressment rested upon the
fact that it had been done as long as anyone could remember
and remained the only adequate method for staffing the
Royal Navy.
By the time Blackstone wrote his Commentaries on the
Laws of England during the mid-eighteenth century,
impressment had fallen out of favor in Britain.

The Lords
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of the Admiralty themselves were "as much averse to the
present method of pressing as any man can be, and wish some
better method was established to man His Majesty's ships." 2
Blackstone documented this general feeling.

"The power of

impressing men," he wrote, "has been a matter of some
dispute, and submitted to with great reluctance." 3
Despite such reluctance, impressment continued.

The

British government tended to be very strict about its
sailors, holding tight to the men who constituted its navy.
There was no recognition of a subject's right to change his
allegiance.

Blackstone emphatically supported this view.

"An Englishman who removes to France, or to China," he
wrote,
owes the same allegiance to the King of England
there as at home ... For it is a principle of
universal law, that the natural born subject of
one prince cannot by an act of his own- no, not
by swearing allegiance to another- put off or
discharge his natural allegiance to the former. 4
This was, in effect, the closing of a loophole.

No matter

how far flung the British Empire, no British sailor was
going to weasel out of service to the Crown.
Using this logic, the British government at first
refused to accept that American independence freed British
seamen who had lived in America prior to 1783.

At the same

time the British Navigation Act required that both the
master and three-quarters of his crew be the same
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nationality as the ship they sailed on.

By 1788 British

officials began to combine these facts to their advantage:
Edward Burrow, the customs officer at Glasgow,
reported ... that he had seized the American Ship
Jenny, guilty of a sensational list of infractions,
including the composition of her crew:
seven
Americans and four Britons ... Henry Wilckens, of
that city, told [Lord] Hawkesbury [President of
the Board of Trade], early in 1790 ... that four
American vessels had recently called at London
and had remained unmolested there although the
master and "every man on board" was British. 5
Clearly the Admiralty, as much "against" impressment as
they were, felt themselves literally surrounded by
deserters simply begging to be pressed back into service.
This was an attitude that was bound to be troublesome.
The diplomatic controversy began in 1787 when English
captains, preparing for war with France, began impressing
sailors who claimed to be American.

Andre Limozin, an

American minister stationed in France, wrote to Secretary
of State Thomas Jefferson in September that "[w]e have been
informed yesterday ... that there is now a general Press for
the Sailors thro all England. " 6

And by mid-October he

could relate the specific instance of a British tobacco
ship that had just arrived from Virginia:
The ship has an American crew, or so they declare
under oath ... but the master, hearing that all
British officers are called home, intends to proceed
to London and threatens when in Liquor (which case
happens to be often) to deliver the whole crew on
board British men of war. 7
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Such narrations illustrated how easy it was for an
American, seemingly indistinguishable from a subject of the
Crown, to end up serving on a British ship of war.
Jefferson promptly instructed Limozin to protect
American sailors "against being carried against their will
to England, where they will certainly be impressed to serve
against France, and, if taken prisoner by the latter, may
perhaps be hung as pyrates." 8

Again, Jefferson showed the

peril of these sailors who, once forced against their will
to fight for England, could then be hanged as war criminals
by France.

What he did not address was the general

ineffectuality of the American envoys in securing the
release of wrongly impressed men.
By the time Jefferson's message arrived the danger of
war between France and Britain had blown over.
pattern was set.

Still, the

In fact, the incident Limozin spoke of

was an almost classic example of the impressments to come.
First there would be an instance of arbitrary British
impressment, usually by an irascible and dictatorial
British captain.

Then the pressed sailors claimed with

little or no proof that they were American.

After an

ineffectual response from the American government which
left the greater question of impressment unresolved, a
beleaguered American official in a foreign port would
"demand" the sailors release.

The sailors would, of

course, not be released, or at least not for some time.
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This pattern recurred again and again throughout the
twenty-five or so years of the impressment controversy.
In early 1790, war between France and Britain loomed
once more on the horizon and retired Senator John Rutledge
wrote Jefferson from London that "three thousand seamen had
been pressed the night before." 9
astounding as it sounds.
such sweeps.

This was not as

The press gangs often operated in

However, many of the pressed were American,

or claimed to be, and Rutledge soon ran up against what was
to become the recurring problem of inadequate proof of
American citizenship.

"In general, the press officers have

objected to the proofs offered of [our sailors] being
Americans."

Rutledge wrote, adding that he hoped merchants

would convince their captains to obtain proper citizenship
papers for their sailors. 10
The very question of such certificates was to become a
key stumbling block to the resolution of impressment.

In

the years to come, America would offer detailed refusals of
the plan.

At this point Rutledge's advice was simply

ignored, thereby allowing the impressments to go on
unhindered.

"A merchant of Boston," wrote William Short,

the american minister to France, "assured me there had been
more than three hundred American sailors impressed into the
British service." 11

American consuls Nathaniel Barrett and

David Humphreys concurred.

Barrett wrote, "Every vessel

which arrives is subject to the Inconvenience of having her
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men taken out and in many instances conveyed out of the way
of redress. " 12
Humphreys voiced even stronger concern.

"No vessel

arrives from any Port that is not entirely stript of its
Crew by the Press Gangs." 13
It was easy to get worked up over the problem as not
only was the fate of the sailors horrendous but the
impressments themselves were relentless.

The somewhat

frenzied response of the American consuls would be repeated
by other Americans on both sides of the Atlantic in years
to come.
The Foreign Office and the Admiralty responded to such
charges by arguing that it was almost impossible to tell an
American sailor from a British counterpart.

Jefferson's

informant in London, John Brown Cutting, wrote to the
Secretary of State in July of 1790 telling of his attempts
to discuss the matter.

"I was told there was much

difficulty in discriminating an American from a British
seaman:

that many British attempted to pass for

Americans. " 14

Finally, in November, consul Joshua Johnson

informed Jefferson about his talks:
I have had some conversation with the Duke of
Leeds' Secretary ... on the Subject of what
Constitutes an American Subject, and that of
an English one; his answer was that the similarity
of manners, language etc. put it out of the power
of Government to discriminate. 15
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This similarity was separately noted by others.

George

Hammond, first British minister to America, wrote to
President Washington, warning that "[t]he practice in Great
Britain of impressing seamen whenever war is apprehended,
will fall more heavily on yours than ... any foreign nation,
on account of the similarity of language. " 16

Confusion

between the nationalities was compounded by the fact that
British sailors wishing to escape military service often
obtained faulty American citizenship papers and then signed
on board United States' merchant ships.

Even as late as

1794 Lord Grenville, the British Foreign Secretary, could
complain to John Jay that, "Such cases have occasionally
arisen ... especially where there so often exists an interest
and intention to deceive. " 17

Though there were many reasons

for British sailors to sign on to American trade vessels,
safety was a prime motive.
The British seaman's bent toward desertion was
encouraged by many Americans.

The carrying trade between

the West Indies and Europe was primarily in American hands,
a development which drew large numbers of British sailors
into the American merchant service.

British seamen were

urged to desert by American merchants in every port in the
States.

In fact, every British Government packet which

entered New York harbor during the winter of 1801 lost
almost its entire crew.
fake citizenship papers . 18

These deserters easily obtained
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The official American line on persuasion to desert was
quite different.

Thomas Jefferson claimed, "You ask, what

encouragements are given to emigrants by the several
States?

No other than a permission to become citizens."

However, even Jefferson had to admit that the rules for
granting citizenship were "not uniform" in the United
States. 19

In 1790, Lord Hawkesbury voiced his anger over

what he termed American "nurseries of seamen" although he
felt that "this evil is also without remedy. " 20

And in

1794, after the start of the Anglo-French War, George
Hammond admitted that America used "every artifice ... to
induce British Seamen to desert from the Ships on which
they arrive. " 21

Although these accounts are somewhat

exaggerated there can be no doubt that Americans were
vigorously involved in the attempt to encourage desertion.
Such behavior undoubtedly led to bad feelings in the
British Admiralty and contributed to various delays and
evasions in the release of wrongly impressed men.
impressment was not yet a foreground issue.

Still,

With no truly

serious incident to get excited about, the American
government remained calm, merely making a few less than
strenuous efforts to limit the practice.

The only people

truly concerned seemed to be American consuls who spent a
large portion of their time in the attempt to free American
sailors.

It was these men who stressed the need for

certificates of citizenship as a prevention from
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impressment.

Joshua Johnson wrote to Jefferson telling of

his plan to give out a general protection to every American
citizen on the back of their shipping articles. 22

Their

advice was ignored at best, disagreed with at worst.
In July of 1792, Jefferson ordered American minister
to Britain Thomas Pinckney to open talks on impressmente
Jefferson had rejected the idea of requiring American
sailors to carry proof of citizenship feeling it would
weaken their legal standing:
We entirely reject ... that our seamen should
always carry about them certificates of their
citizenship. This is a condition never yet
submitted to by any nation ... [Through the] loss
of this paper evidence ... the British government
would be armed with legal authority to impress
the whole of our seamen.n
This argument would dominate American relations with
Britain for the next generation, though whether Jefferson
worried about the loss of citizenship papers or the loss of
much needed British sailors is not clear.
Pinckney met with Lord Grenville to deliver
Jefferson's plan.

!'I then proposed to him the plan which

you suggested of letting the Vessels protect a certain
number of men according to their tonnage."

Specifically,

America was willing to let British officers check the
number of men on United States ships as long as no press
gangs would come aboard unless there were more men than the
listed amount.

Naturally, this was unacceptable:

He said the obvious objection to this proposal
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was that in case of war with any other nation
[American] vessels would afford such protection
to [British] sailors as would induce them to
crowd into our Vessels to the manifest injury
both of their royal navy and merchant service.~
The British government insisted that the number of sailors
on board a ship had very little to do with the number of
British sailors it carried.

It could ill afford to let

American vessels pass unmolested simply because their crew
was listed as thirty men and that was how many were there.
Despite the complaints of America's foreign ministers,
at this point impressment was far from the head of the list
when it came to Anglo-American discord.

On March 5, 1794

Jefferson's successor as Secretary of State, Edmund
Randolph, gave Congress a report on foreign aggressions
against American commerce.

Though impressment was

mentioned it was only one of several anti-British charges,
all of which were given a corresponding French grievance. 25
The lack of interest in the topic is further
demonstrated by the response in the House of
Representatives to a bill to protect American sailors.
Issued in the spring of 1794, the bill moved to "enable
American seamen to obtain and carry evidence of
citizenship, for the purpose of protecting them from
impressment into foreign service. " 26

It was the infamous

proof of citizenship that Jefferson had already turned
down.

After a month, the bill was debated.

"Mr.

Fitzsimmons was against the bill ... because every man ... who
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has not a certificate, will, in future,

if the law takes

place, be considered as not American." 27

A suspiciously

Jeffersonian statement.

Murray defended his bill, "It was

not his intention," he said, "to promise a complete system
in this desirable point.

His wish was rather to secure the

advantages which certainly were within our reach."
Whatever the advantages were to Murray's admittedly
incomplete plan they were undoubtedly less than apparent.
The bill was voted down the same day. 28
Only America's foreign officials were inclined to
treat the problem as if it had any need to be resolved.
John Jay was in Britain at the time working on the Treaty
of Amity, Commerce and Navigation.

Though his instructions

contained nothing on impressment he broached the topic
anyway.

On July 23, 1794, Jay tried to pressure Lord

Grenville into giving on impressment rather than have
negative public opinion in America jeopardize their treaty
negotiations:
The cases of captures transmitted to me are
numerous ... It appears to me unfortunate that the
vessels lately sailed from hence to America carry
with them discontents on account of Americans
impressed and detained. Those discontents will
naturally add to the impressions made by masters
of vessels and others daily returning from the
West Indies, and publishing details of the
severities which they there experienced. 30
Soon after, on July 30, Jay again expressed the hope, "that
[impressed] Americans ... be immediately liberated, and that
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persons ... with His Majesty's commissions do, in future,
abstain from similar violences. " 31
Grenville agreed that wrongful impressment was
unfortunate but stopped short of throwing out the
traditional method Britain had of manning its navy:
On the subject of the impress ... if ... American
seamen have been impressed ... it has been contrary
to the King's desire ... With respect to the desire
expressed by Mr. Jay that new orders might be
given with a view to prevent ... [wrongful
impressment), Lord Grenville has ... obtained
His Majesty's permission to assure Mr. Jay,
that instructions, to the effect desired, will
be renewed.n
In other words, nothing was going to happen.

The only

headway Jay made was to get Grenville to finally agree that
those resident in America at the moment of independence
were American citizens:
I do not think one instance can be brought
where a seaman has not been discharged, who
could produce ... any probable ... ground for
supposing him a native citizen of the u.s.,
or a resident there at the time of the separation
from (Great Britain].n
There were however, numerous incidents of American sailors
who had died in the service of the Royal Navy while engaged
in years-long battles to regain their freedom.
Paradoxically, as the other issues in Anglo-American
relations reached a settlement, impressment began to
worsen.

In November of 1794 Jay and Grenville signed the

Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation and the two
countries were placed on a more amicable basis than ever.
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Just weeks later the Royal Navy would again need a surplus
of men for the just renewed war with France.

Impressment

would increase dramatically, and jump to the forefront of
United States-British diplomacy.

CHAPTER II
THE MANNING PROBLEM
The dispute over impressment was caused by an acute
shortage of sailors.

There simply were not enough trained

and able-bodied seamen to staff both the growing American
merchant fleet and the British royal navy while it was at
war with France.

Beyond this shortage the royal Navy faced

a further obstacle.

The Navigation Act stipulated that

every British merchant ship maintain a staff that was at
least three-quarters British. 1

Though Parliament reduced

the percentage to one-quarter for the duration of the war
there still weren't enough sailors. 2

By end of the

eighteenth century the British navy was twice as large as
it had been fifty years before.

There were approximately

250 ships in service in 1700, this number had risen to just
over 500 by the year 1790. 3
The type of man who could be pressed was strictly
regulated.

So-called "landmen" were ineligible.

In 1776,

Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice, had ruled:
Persons liable must come purely within the
description of seamen ... He ... who is not within
the description does not come within the usage.
The commission is not to impress landmen. 4
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Which was about as clear as it got.

To top off the

Admiralty's problems, the practice was decidedly unpopular,
both abroad and at home.
Originally the term "gang" meant a group of sailors
assigned to a specific task.

The activities of the press

gangs gave the word the negative and violent connotations
it carries today.

The violence, however, was not always

perpetrated by the gangs themselves.

In the absence of any

real police force press gangs often found themselves
subject to verbal and physical harassment.

In 1803 one

captain told of how his gang of men, "were attacked by
large mobs, principally women, who by throwing things hurt
several officers and rescued several men.
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Another officer in charge of a press gang wrote:
On one occasion I was assaulted by a shower of
brickbats: on another, a volley of either musket
or pistol balls was fired into my room one evening
as I was reading at my table. 6
Clearly, British subjects may have loved their King, but
they hated his press gangs.

Because of the hardships

associated with pressing on land the gangs often found it
easier to do their work at sea.

In 1795 the Admiralty had

a force of 528 sailors at Dover just for this purpose. 7
While Britain's navy suffered under this lack of
sailors the government continued to receive reports of
British sailors aboard "divers Foreign ships."g

Something
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had to be done.

Early in April, 1795 an Order in Council

put an embargo on all foreign ships in British ports. 9
On receiving the Order, Admiral William Parker,
commander of the undermanned Jamaica Station, insisted all
foreign ships be:
thoroughly examined ... particularly Americans, for
the purpose of detecting English Seamen that may
be concealed on board ... you are to cause them to
be taken out, as also Such as have not Certificates
of Citizenship. 10
This would seem to be a rather transparent ploy for the
quick acquisition of as many able-bodies seamen as Parker
could lay his hands on.

The Admiral's need for these men

was mostly due to deaths among his own sailors from
disease, a problem for which Jamaica Station was infamous.
In 1745 the Admiralty had punished one commander for
"letting his Men know the Service he was going in, which
resulted in total desertion." 11

The Admiral's anti-American

prejudice is a different question.

It seems likely to have

come from a combination of actual experience of American ·
'recruitment' efforts and reports from the home office.
In defense the United States government charged that
short-handed British officers would deliberately impress
Americans.

Secretary of State James Madison wrote angrily

to Rufus King:
The complaints daily arriving at this office
show that our mariners are impressed without
the least respect for their legal protections,
certified in the most authentic forms ... It cannot
be pleaded that the seamen in question were taken
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in vessels where they had entered voluntarily ... These
wrongs have made a deep impression on the American
mind. 12
However, what Madison referred to as "authentic" forms of
certification were often the most woefully inadequate and
poorly documented of "proofs".
The British government vigorously denied deliberate
impressment, stating that they had no desire "to acquire
American seamen."

England's object was the "much broader

and more important one of guarding herself from being
deprived of her own. " 13

However, only rarely did an abusive

British officer to get so much as a scolding.
The Anglo-French War eventually drew in Holland and
Spain as well leaving most of the European colonial trade
in American hands.

Three years before the war, American

ships carried 59 percent of the nation's foreign trade.
1795 the proportion had increased to 90 percent. 14

By

American

shipping could only expand this dramatically through the
liberal use of foreign sailors.

Thus, America's refusal,

indeed inability, to cease in the employment of British
sailors contributed substantially to the dispute.
Increased demand for sailors caused the British to raise
the pay of their seamen to lure deserters back. 15

The

United States was not oblivious to the economic threat to
the well-being of its merchant fleet.
to Thomas Jefferson:

Joshua Johnson wrote
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It has occurred to me that granting Protection to
individuals, they may make use of them to the
prejudice of the Navigation and Commerce of
our Country, by entering in the Service of those,
who will pay the highest Wages, the English now
give Three pounds five shillings Sterling per
Month, while the Americans only give thirty-Six
Shillings. 16
Here was yet another reason not to give sailors
protections.

A protected sailor was a safe sailor, in

effect, a free agent able to work for whom he chose.

Such

arrangements appeared to threaten American maritime
interests.
Consul William Knox also saw the inherent economic
danger and wrote to Jefferson from Dublin:
It is an object of great consequence to American
commerce for regulation between the United States
and England determining American citizenship
exclusive of birth. 17
Knox expressed a sentiment typical of America's foreign
ministers, the desire for adequate proofs of citizenship.
Typically, he was ignored.
The pay on British merchant vessels also rose at this
time.

While wages in the 1740's were rarely more than

forty-two shillings, during the war they rose as high as
sixty shillings per month. 18
short of sailors.

Britain still found herself

It would seem then, with pay being so

much higher in the British navy, that the real attraction
was absconding from military service.

Though British

merchant ships paid more than their American counterparts
they were also based in England.

This proximity to the
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home country undoubtedly made a man's chances of
impressment appreciably greater.

Once a man was impressed

he was placed on a war ship and taken to battle which was a
dangerous and uncertain way to make a living.

Though the

pay was more, you had to be alive in order to spend it.
Early in 1807, Secretary of the Treasury Albert
Gallatin conducted a study to see if America could afford
to stop using British sailors.

He found that half the

seamen on United States vessels were British.
"recruited 2, 500 British sailors every year. " 19

Americans
Jefferson

replied, "Your estimate of the number of foreign seamen in
our employ, renders it prudent ... to drop the idea of any
proposition not to employ them.
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Indeed, America never did stop in her efforts to
entice British sailors into service on her merchant
vessels.

British officials reported in later years that

nearly every British war ship that landed in America lost
part of her crew.

Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, commanding the

Jamaica Station from 1796 to 1801, claimed it was
"perfectly well known to us that two-thirds of the Seamen
that Navigate the American Trade are ... English seamen. " 21
Any officer who felt this way, and many seemed to, was
unlikely to give a sailor with inadequate proof of
citizenship the benefit of the doubt.
The British government was arbitrary in their use of
the impressment system.

If even British subjects were
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enraged by the practice it seems only natural that
Americans would be all the more upset.

They were.

Yet the

Admiralty continued on with impressments, justifying them
as the only way to man the all-important royal navy.
The American government also carried its share of the
blame.

By refusing to stop the corrupt and illegal methods

by which British sailors magically became American citizens
the United States government appeared to support, and off
the record did support those actions.

CHAPTER III
THE AMERICAN RESPONSE
Just as no British government ever seriously
considered stopping impressment, no United States
administration ever admitted to Britain's right to impress
on the high seas.

American arguments came from different

angles but always agreed that the practice was
unacceptable.
President John Adams denied Britain's right because of
the complete absence of any such right in writings on the
law of nations:
There is no principle under heaven, by which
they can justify taking by force ... even a deserter
from their own army or navy ... the thing has
absolutely no principle. 1
This was notwithstanding the British 'legal' defense
previously discussed.

While this defense is rather shaky

it apparently worked for the Admiralty.
Thomas Jefferson believed that a merchant vessel was
part of the territory of a sovereign state, though he never
made his beliefs official.
I write this, too ... that it may not be considered
as official, but merely my individual opinion ... On
an element which nature has not subjected to the
jurisdiction of any particular nation ... it would
seem that the particular portion ... occupied by the
vessel of any nation ... is for the moment, the
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exclusive property of that nation, and with the
vessel, is exempt from intrusion by any other. 2
Jefferson was thus claiming the high seas to be the
sovereign territory of any ship traveling on them at a
given moment.

Under this somewhat radical view, to board a

United States merchant ship on the high seas would be the
equivalent of an invasion of American territory.

An act of

war.
News of increased impressments reached America at the
same time debate began in the Senate on Jay's Treaty.
two issues quickly became intertwined.

The

Anti-treaty forces

latched on to impressment, loudly decrying the lack of a
section in the treaty against the practice.

This, they

said, was reason enough not to ratify the agreement. 3
Jay warned "the forming of any very satisfactory
arrangement" on impressment would "prove an arduous task" 4
but, probably due to his personal feelings on the subject,
he recommended the attempt be made.

The focus on

impressment as a tool to fight the treaty brought the issue
to many people's attention for the first time.
was a flurry of Congressional activity.

The result

Edward Livingston,

an opponent of the treaty, suggested on February 19, 1796,
that the House appoint a committee:
To enquire ... whether any and what Legislative
provision is necessary for the relief of such
American seamen as may have been impressed" and
"to report a mode of furnishing American seamen
with such evidence of their citizenship as may
protect them from foreign impressment.
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Such a committee was formed and on February 25 recommended:
A plan to afford [impressed sailors] relief,
the principle part of which is that two agents
shall be appointed by the United States, one to
be sent over to England and the other to the West
Indies ... to release such as they are able ... and
learn the number of citizens who have been
illegally seized. 6
With the new interest in impressment it was now necessary
not just to fight the impressments but also to accurately
determine just how bad the problem was.
on March 1 the resolution carried. 7

The first Act for

the Relief and Protection of American Seamen was the
result.

The act came to a vote in the House of

Representatives on March 28, 1796.

As the act's chief

proponent, Congressman Livingston declared "there could be
no doubt that American seamen had been impressed and very
grossly abused."

Thus the act was sorely needed.

hard to argue with such basic logic.

It was

After Livingston's

lengthy speech "the question was decided in the
affirmative- yeas 77, nays 13." 8
In an attempt to halt the problem entirely the act
included a list of proofs required to establish a man as an
American citizen.

"The certificates which would be issued

would be descriptive of the kind of citizenship of its
possessor." 9

These descriptions were dropped by a joint

House-Senate committee.
Instead of having certificates issued to three
descriptions of American citizens, viz: natives,
foreigners who were in this country in 1783, and
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those who have obtained their citizenship since,
they are all to be included under the head of
American citizens. 10
These, however, were the kind of distinctions Britain
required, so the certificates called for were to be no real
protection at all.
Blissfully unaware of this, the Senate began
consideration the next day.

By April 19 the Senate had a

bill they liked, but not the one that had passed the House.
Rather than making a strong statement in favor of United
States sovereignty and neutral rights they simply said it
was "the duty of the master of every ship ... of the United
States, any of the crew whereof shall have been
impressed ... immediately to make a protest. " 11

As if masters

of ships typically would not make a protest while their
sailors were hustled away.

The watered down bill, which

also eliminated all mention of proofs of citizenship,
passed the Senate on April 20. 12

Not surprisingly, this

useless act did not suffice to quiet the House.

On May 28:

The Speaker laid before the House a letter which
he had received from ten American captains, now ...
at Jamaica complaining of the illegal impressment
of their seamen by British ships of war ... They
pray for the interference of Government. 13
No interference was forthcoming, but the incident did serve
to keep the topic of impressment fresh in the Congressmen's
minds.
A few months later Congressman William Vans Murray
moved to amend the existing act to require seamen to
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produce a birth or baptismal record from their home along
with the testimony of a witness.

One of the specifically

stated reasons for this revision of the act was:
Two clauses had been omitted in the bill for
the protection ... of American Seamen. They were
the clauses respecting certificates, on which
the two Houses had differed in opinion. 14
This was perhaps the only attempt at setting guidelines for
American citizenship papers that met with no opposition.
Quite the opposite.

On March 1, 1797 an attempt was made

to make the requirements for American citizenship even
stricter.
Mr. Harper spoke at considerable length
against the mode laid down for the ascertaining
of citizenship, which was to be proved ... by
one credible witness. Mr. Harper proposed that
the testimony of three freeholders should be
necessary.
This proved to be too much even for the House where the
proposal was immediately negatived, garnering a mere three
votes. 15

Though the House passed the amendment on March 2 ,

1797, the Senate put off any action until the next session
effectively tabling the bill. 16
At this time Rufus King was sent to Britain as
America's new minister.

Secretary of State Madison's

initial instructions refrained from asking him to strongly
protest impressment.

Privately, Madison claimed to be

satisfied with Anglo-American relations.

"The present

policy of the British government treats the United States
with more respect and conciliation than heretofore." 17
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Nevertheless, on August 10, King, newly arrived in London,
told Lord Grenville that America wanted to renew talks
about impressment.

His government "thought after fair

reflection ... that we were entitled to pass the high seas
without interruption.
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Grenville replied that he would have to discuss it
with the First Lord of the Admiralty before he could speak
on the topic.

This was undoubtedly because of the ever

growing evidence that United States officials would sell
citizenship to anyone who could afford it.

In the House of

Commons it was announced:
In ... New York ... the collector one day allowed
an old woman to qualify a whole host of seamen ...
by swearing that she knew they were American
citizens ... The very clerk remonstrated against
[the transaction's] baseness ... The reply of the
collector was that it was no business of his ... and
the old woman continued during the whole of the
day to receive her two dollars for every oath that
she took ... In Philadelphia occurrences of a similar
nature had taken place. 19
Instances of such flagrant abuses were far from rare in
America's headlong rush to gather the sailors of the world
into her merchant fleet.

Because of such behavior Britain

felt justified in using whatever means necessary to regain
their lost sailors.

The British government armed Grenville

with a report from the law office to the effect that a
belligerent was entitled to remove his own subjects from on
board a neutral vessel.w

The battle was joined again.
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As a Senator, King had always had his doubts about the
efficacy of the American system of citizenship proofs.
he found his reservations justified. 21

Now

The British,

predictably, put little stock in these easily obtainable
certificates.

Lord Grenville asked King to tell the

American consuls in Britain that they were exceeding their
authority by issuing them.
I have considered the proposals, contained in
your letter ... It seems scarcely possible for the
King's government to accede to any arrangement
grounded on such a basis, without risking the
total sacrifice of that on which depends the
whole maritime force of Great Britain.n
The American certificates were thus felt to be too weak for
Britain to even consider using them as a basis for limiting
impressment.
King complied with Grenville's request, holding out
the vain hope that Congress might toughen its useless law.
He wrote to Jonathan Dayton, Speaker of the House, a month
after he'd heard from Grenville.
I must request you to consider ... the provisions
of the act of Congress ... respecting the
certificates of citizenship ... The act does not
in any manner specify the nature of the proof on
which these certificates are to be granted ... It
is not required by the law ... that the certificate
should distinguish ... the grounds upon which it is
granted.D
His request was not considered and the problem then went on
for some time with consuls continuing to issue their
worthless protections which Britain continued to ignore.

29

In August, 1797, Grenville dogmatically stated that
certificates issued by United States consuls would not "be
considered ... as affording any evidence of the birth or
Citizenship of the persons exhibiting them. " 24
had little effect.

Even this

As late as 1806, Thomas Jefferson could

write to Madison:
I think it would be proper to send to [the
collectors] a copy of the papers respectively
concerning them ... as to admonish them to be
scrupulously exact in their issuing certificates
of citizenship, as the contrary conduct disgraces

us.~

Which was an interesting comment since the "disgrace" had
by then been going on for some ten years.
Congressman Livingston, a hard man to keep quiet on
the subject, made a final attempt to solve the protections
difficulty.

In December of 1797 he reminded the House of

William Vans Murray's attempt to amend the Act for the
Protection of American Seamen:
That a bill passed the House in February last, for
the relief and protection of American Seamen, but
not being acted upon by the Senate, he found it
would be necessary to bring forward the business
anew in the House.u
Which he proceeded to do in a most unique manner.
Livingston attempted to make captains financially
responsible for their crew.

His amendment required

"masters of vessels to give bond to bring back, or give a
due account of all the sailors they take out on their
voyages."

This sort of amendment was bad for business and
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thus bound to be unpopular.

Consideration was postponed

because of various objections and after February, 1798 the
amendment was never discussed again. 27

In fact, the entire

matter idled for most of the rest of the year until an
incident at Cuba again excited interest.
On December 31, 1798, Congressman Harrison Otis
introduced into the House:
a report ... relative to the impressment of a
number of American seamen from a vessel of war
of the United States [the Baltimore] into an armed
ship of Great Britain.
It was a case similar to the impressments in the West
Indies which had first brought impressment to the attention
of Congress.
effect.

Now the new announcement had a similar

The House immediately request ed the President

send them any pertinent information on this case. 28

By

January 8, 1799, Congress received a letter sent to the
Secretary of State by George Morton, U.S. consul at Havana
"of the partial capture of an American fleet under the
convoy of the Baltimore sloop-of-war."

Morton included a

letter from Lewis Trezevant and William Timmons who
witnessed the incident, though they were not on board the
Baltimore.
Captain Phillips ... informed us that ... the
Commodore had told him that he should take out
of the Baltimore all such men as had not American
protections ... he had remonstrated against (the
Commodore] ... as not even those who were really
Americans ... could show protections, because it
was always thought that our flag, on board of a
Government ship, was a sufficient protection.
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Of course, it was not, and the captain must have known it.
In the end fifty-five men were removed from the Baltimore,
though all but five were

returned.~

When the facts were known the case seemed less
substantial and appears to have had scant impact.

Congress

did pass a new version of the protection Act in February,
1799 and the Senate approved it in March. 30

Unfortunately

the only revision was a request that the Secretary of State
submit an annual report on impressments. 31
At the same time, Rufus King had finally had enough of
Lord Grenville's evasions.

Discouraged, he wrote to

Secretary of State Timothy Pickering in July:
I have attempted again and again ... without
success to convince this Government that both
Justice and a friendly Policy required of them
to agree with us in a Convention ... that should
at the same time give to them as well as to us
adequate and reasonable security in regard to our
respective Interests ... I have ceased to urge it
from a full persuasion that my Exertions would be
fruitless.n
Despite these words from their own envoy it is apparent
that the American government was as unconcerned as the
British.

Not until December 12, 1800 was the subject again

broached in the Senate.
The Vice-President laid before the Senate a
report from the Secretary ... of state, in pursuance
of the 'Act to revive and continue in force certain
parts of the act for the relief and protection of
American seamen' ... and the report was read, and
ordered to lie for consideration. 33
No such act was passed.
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The Peace of Arniens in 1801 ended British-French
aggression and pushed impressment even farther into the
background.

However, United States agents in Great Britain

had unexpected difficulties obtaining the release of
captured sailors.

One such agent, David Lenox, wrote to

Secretary of State Madison in March, 1802.

"I had, with

you, anticipated the discharge of all seamen claiming
protection as American citizens, on peace taking place ... In
this I have been disappointed. " 34

Though Britain now had no

immediate need of the impressed sailors the government
could not afford to relax their stance on the impressment
issue.

Lenox wrote to Even Nepean of the Admiralty Office:

! . . . send you ... a list of 558 seamen, representing
themselves to be citizens of the United States of
America and detained on board His ... Majesty's
fleets, for whose discharge I made applications ...
and to which answers were returned stating that,
having no documents to prove their citizenship,
the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty could
not consent to their discharge.~

The Admiralty could not release a sailor who had no proof
of citizenship simply on the basis that he claimed to be
American.

Not if they wanted to maintain any degree of

consistency at all.
William Marsden attempted to explain the matter to
Lenox three days later:
The admission of the principle that a man
declaring himself to belong to a foreign State
should, upon that assertation merely ... be suffered
to leave the service, would be productive of the
most dangerous consequences to His Majesty's navy. 36
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Britain's dilemma is clear.

Marsden was right that just

saying you were American was hardly enough.

Deserters were

doing that already.
in retrospect it was probably for the best that
Britain kept her acquisitions.
1803.

War broke out again in may,

By July American newspapers were full of reports of

renewed impressments.

The Philadelphia Aurora demanded

Britain "should frankly and perfectly respect the
neutrality of the United States.
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Boston's Independent

Chronicle called for America "to take a stand, as it
respects our neutral situation. " 38

And the Salem Register

warned that British impressments could "arouse the
indignation of the American people. " 39

If the papers were

any judge, the American public was becoming fed up with the
British practice.
In May, 1803, Rufus King made his final attempt to
halt high seas impressments.

Admiral st. Vincent, First

Lord of the Admiralty, even agreed to the terms of a
convention, before quickly backing out.

He excused himself

to King by saying that he could not agree because the
proposed ban on impressments covered the narrow seas [the
English Channel and the Irish Sea] which Britain considered
territorial waters. 4° King left England on May 21, 1803,
defeated, though he later believed he might have been
successful if he'd stayed in England longer. 41
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Though the situation was rapidly growing worse
President Jefferson's administration attempted to maintain
calm.

Jefferson announced in October that America's goal

was "to cultivate the friendship of the belligerent
nations. " 42

Public outrage made it hard for his

administration to act cautiously.

Jefferson decided to

take as official U.S. policy the points King had managed to
get unofficial agreement on.
On the subject of our seamen, as both parties
were agreed against impressments at sea, and
concealments in port, I suppose we may practice
on those two articles as things understood,
alth'o no convention was signed. 43
Aside from the fact that it is useless to try to force a
country to adhere to unofficial agreements, the British had
never agreed against impressments at sea.

They merely

stated that they were not deliberately impressing American
citizens.
In an attempt to prevent any incidents from developing
Madison sent instructions to King's replacement, James
Monroe in October.
from impressments.M

He insisted naval officers "abstain"
Regrettably, Great Britain was in no

position to stop the practice.
frequency yet again.

Desertions rose in

In late November the House of Commons

was busy discussing a "bill for preventing the desertion of
guilty officers and seamen. " 45

This bill passed on March 9,

1804 and included a provision "for punishing mutiny and
desertion" as well as one "for allowing vessels ... charting
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out from any port in Great Britain to complete their full
number of men at certain ports for the present. " 46

Since

laws are generally not passed without a reason it seems
safe to extrapolate that England was experiencing its fair
share of desertions, was in need of sailors and was not too
picky about where she got them.
In August, Madison gave Monroe instructions for new
talks on impressment.

If Britain would agree that the

United States flag gave protection to those traveling under
it, America would promise unconditional surrender of all
deserters. 47

But Madison was also told to wait.

The

Jefferson administration had placed itself in a cautious
holding pattern until the arrival of the new British
minister to America, Anthony Merry.

CHAPTER IV
ANTHONY MERRY AND JAMES MONROE
In late November, 1803 Anthony Merry arrived to become
British Minister to the United States.

Secretary of State

Madison lost no time opening talks on the subject of
impressment.

Lord Hawkesbury, Grenville's successor, gave

Merry no advice on the topic, instead ordering him to be a
general good will messenger.
You will deliver to [the President] ... His
Majesty's sincere anxiety to promote and improve
the Harmony and good Understanding which so happily
subsist between His Majesty's Government and that
of the United States. 1
Good advice, but unhelpful for the problems of the moment.
During Merry's term as minister the issues of greatest
concern were maritime, impressment one of the most
important.

From 1803 until the start of the War of 1812

just over 6,000 Americans were pressed into British
service. 2

Many Americans suspected the increase was meant

to destroy America's growing merchant marine.
(Congressman) Crowninshield said that ... he
thought these impressments ought to be prevented ...
His intention was to prevent the American carrying
trade to the West Indies from falling into the
hands of other nations. 3
In turn some British suspected American politicians were
enlarging the issue for the sake of domestic political
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gains.

As early as 1801, Edward Thornton, then British

Minister at Washington, complained that despite peace
between America and Britain desertion of seamen was
encouraged in every United States port.

He claimed this

was a method used to keep British shipping out of American
ports where it competed with United States shippingo 4
Merry also distrusted American motives.
Dr. Franklin Jameson once said Merry served as
minister "in pompous unhappiness.
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have been an accurate assessment.

and it would seem to
In his first dispatch to

the Foreign Office Merry reported that Madison had spoken
of impressments three times.

He also stated that he

thought the American government was using the issue to get
"a greater respect" for the American flag so they could
gain "a more convenient system of neutral Navigation" than
Britain had previously agreed to. 6
While Madison and Merry discussed impressment Congress
did as well.

On November 22 the Senate demanded "that the

President ... cause to be laid before the Senate ...
information ... relative to the ... impressment of any seamen
in the service of the United States" since the renewal of
the Anglo-French War in May. 7

On December 5, Madison

reported that seventy men had been impressed, forty-three
of whom were Americans. 8

The actual numbers were far

higher but this news was not received until March, 1804. 9
The numbers were apparently high enough already.

On
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December 12 the Senate appointed a committee to study the
need for further protective measures for American sailors. 10
On January 14 this committee introduced a bill to close
American ports to men guilty of impressment and to outlaw
the loading or landing of cargo to or from ships of the
offending nation. 11
Merry was sure this was due to hostile anti-British
sentiments in Jefferson's administration.

He reported:

Instead of these Steps having been produced
by any general Sensation of the People ... I ... fear
they have been produced solely by the unfriendly
Disposition of the executive whose influence was
so great in Congress. 12
Merry was surely mistaken.

Jefferson had already made it

abundantly clear in his personal correspondence that his
government was dedicated to a cautious policy of restraint.
In March, 1801 he wrote to Thomas Paine:
Determined as we are to avoid ... wasting the
energies of our people in war and destruction,
we shall avoid implicating ourselves with the
powers of Europe, even in support of principles
which we mean to pursue ... we believe we can
enforce those principles ... by peaceable means.
This was a sentiment typical of Thomas Jefferson, a firm
believer in the power of rational discourse.

In October of

the same year Jefferson again stressed his desire for peace
in a letter to William Short.
We have a perfect horror at everything like
connecting ourselves with the politics of Europe ..
To be entangled with them would be a much greater
evil than a temporary acquiescence in the false
principles which have prevailed. Peace is our
most important interest. 13

e
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If the President had been anti-British he would hardly have
waited for Merry to arrive before making even the smallest
move on impressment.

Jefferson may have even had a hand in

stopping passage of the bill as it was his close friend,
Senator William Carey Nicholas who made an official
announcement in late February.
"At
"so
and
the

no period of our government" had there existed
cordial a friendship" between Great Britain
America.
"Passage of the bill would disrupt
harmony" between them. " 14

The Senate then postponed further discussion of the billa
Merry, however, was oblivious to the troubles
incessant reports of impressments might be giving Jefferson
and Madison.

He was only concerned with the escalating

number of British deserters.

The Phaeton, which brought

him to New York, had itself lost fourteen men. 15

In April,

1804 he reported that twelve British vessels had been
delayed at Norfolk because of desertions.

Many of the

former British sailors had apparently joined an American
squadron going to the Mediterranean.

Though merry

complained to him personally Madison said that since the
sailors had enlisted voluntarily there was nothing he could
do .t6
By June, 1804 Britain was again desperate for sailorse
The Secretary at War moved [in the House of
Commons] for leave to bring in a bill to enable
his Majesty to raise foreign corps, and indemnifying
those who had taken foreigners into His Majesty's
service . 17
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For the first time Britain was contemplating accepting the
services of foreign sailors, mercenaries.

The act passed

on July 14, "enabling Subjects of Foreign States to enlist
as soldier's in His Majesty's Service.
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Two months later a British merchant vessel, the Pitt,
was boarded in New York harbor by a gang from the British
ship Cambrian and fourteen British seamen were impressed.
British consul Thomas Barclay was very much against such
tactics as they violated American sovereignty. 19

Typically,

he was ignored.
Madison demanded the return of the men, an apology and
the delivery of the officer responsible.

Merry gave him

nothing and referred everything to Lord Hawkesbury, who
also did nothing.w

On August 15, Merry finally washed his

hands of the matter entirely.

He decided that the British

captain had acted within his rights since a French ship had
done much the same thing in Boston harbor several months
earlier with no United States reaction. 21
Merry "a mere Diplomatic pettifogger. " 22

Madison called
But whether he was

angry over Merry's accusation because it was true or false
is difficult to ascertain.
After September, 1804 the State Department bypassed
Merry completely, sending its complaints to the British
government through the American minister in London.
Results were achieved in November when Lord Harrowby, the
Foreign Secretary, wrote to Merry:
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His Majesty's Government have perceived .. ethe
increasing Acrimony ... by the American Secretary
of State on the Subject of the Impressment of
Seamen from on board of American Ships ..• strictest
Orders will be given without delay to the
Commanders of His Majesty's Ships ... to abstain
from Impressments in the Ports of the United
States.n
From now on Americans would only be impressed at sea.

The

British government's previous lack of response was due, in
part, to other distractions.

James Monroe had seen in

April, 1804, that the Addington ministry would not survive
attacks by Pitt on their running of the war.

"While the

late ministry was on the decline it seemed useless to press
it on any concern of ours.
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In May Monroe's prediction

came true and Pitt resumed control.
the situation had been as such:

Up until this point

If a seized American could

prove his birth Madison would send the documents to Monroe
who sent them to the British Admiralty who ordered an
enquiry.

If by then the man wasn't dead from battle or

disease or accident he would probably be released, after a
year or two. 25

Naturally this system was a pain to both the

Admiralty and Monroe and probably accounted for Monroe's
desire to see an end to the trouble.
In early June, Monroe approached the Earl of Harrowby
about impressment.

The new Foreign Secretary said he

wasn't ready to act on it "nor did he know that he should
be during the session of Parliament. 1126
until August 4.

The matter lay

On meeting with Harrowby to discuss Jay's
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Treaty, Monroe once more took the opportunity to discuss
impressments.

Harrowby claimed he had no desire "to

encourage the expectation that there could be an agreement,
nor entirely to preclude it."

Monroe left, understandably

less than enthused, concluding that the Foreign Secretary
"did not wish to encourage the expectation that we should
agree in any arrangement on this head.
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Finally, on September 1, after yet another meeting,
Harrowby agreed to place the matter before the Cabinet. 28
They wasted no time.

By September 20, Sir William Scott

from the High Court of the Admiralty, had informed Harrowby
the American plan to stop high seas impressment was "unfit
to be adapted.
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Monroe left for Spain and the talks were

suspended by "mutual consent.
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Meanwhile, in late 1804, Madison had again responded
to a demand from the House of Representatives "that the
Secretary of State ... lay before this House a return of the
number of ... seamen who have been impressed. " 31

The new

numbers were now based on complete data and showed that
over 1,500 sailors had applied for release from wrongful
impressment.

This came as something of a shock.

One

Congressman commented:
The list ... exceeded in number anything he had
expected. He thought ... that the subject demanded
investigation ... Will the United States tamely
submit to see some of its best citizens torn
from their families and friends ... Shall we see
another country pursuing measures hostile to our
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commercial rights and make no effort to correct
the mischief? 32
The answer was a resounding 'no'.

Talks were resumed with

Merry. 33
Also, an Act for the more effectual preservation of
peace in the ports and harbors of the United States and the
waters under their jurisdiction, passed on March 3, 1850.
This contained a clause much like the act that Jefferson's
friend, Senator Nicholas, had struck down:
Whenever any officer of an armed vessel
commissioned by any foreign power, shall on the
high seas, commit any trespass ... on board any
vessel of the United States ... it shall be lawful ...
to interdict the entrance of the said officer ...
within the limits of the United states.~
This was the first real retaliation from America and could
have been quite a problem as British war ships were
stationed in the Indies and Canada and often travelled
through United States waters.

In response, British

officials again charged America with giving deserters false
American citizenship papers.

Madison replied that they

were making "a very ... unwarranted assertion."

This did not

stop Merry from attempting to get Madison to admit that
illegal certificates were often issued. 35
course, admit nothing.

Madison would, of

After these exchanges, in April,

1805, Merry was never to receive another complaint about a
specific instance of impressment.

One reason for the

United States government to keep the lid on was economic.
If America went to war she would lose her neutral nation
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freight carrying status and thus lose her merchant marinee
The merchant fleet and the money it brought in had been one
of the carrots angled before the American public during the
revolution.

Because of the importance attached to

commercial well-being there was little desire to rock the
boat where it was concerned.

Then, in June, Pitt decided

to obstruct American neutral trade. 36
On June 25, the Duke of Montrose spoke in the House of
Lords:
According to the navigation act there could be
no communication between the United States and
the British West India islands except in British
bottoms. But a power was given to the governor
of every island to allow the importation of
provisions ... in case of necessity.
It having
appeared, however, that some irregularities had
arisen in the exercise of this power and that
a too general importation had been permitted,
directions were sent out to the governors not
to make too frequent use of the discretion.n
Now Britain was hitting America where it lived, in the
purse strings.

Negative response was only a matter of

time.
At around the same time James Monroe returned to
London and called on the new Foreign Secretary, the Earl of
Mulgrave, to talk once more about impressment. 38
had changed.
Pitt.

But things

The government and the navy now belonged to

Addington men were firmly on the outside.

Complaints had even been heard in Parliament:
Earl Darnley rose and expressed his regret ..
[that) the persons who had the superintendence
of the naval department ... seemed to have come

o
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into office upon the specific pledge of wholly
reversing the system of their predecessors. 39
Certainly this was a bit of party rhetoric, but it aptly
described Pitt's new view towards the carrying trade in the
West Indies.
Monroe waited for three weeks after his meeting with
Mulgrave with no response.

At last he decided to pressure

the secretary by announcing his imminent return to
America. 40

This got Mulgrave's attention.

He wrote Prime

Minister Pitt on October 12:
Mr. Monroe's notice of his leave ... is sudden
and unexpected, some answer good or bad ... must
be given to Him ... it would have an awkward
appearance ... if he were suffered to depart Home
without any answer from this Government. 41
Mulgrave sent Monroe a note in late November which,
according to Monroe, "revived the expectation" that he
might see some action.

Unfortunately, Mulgrave was only

concerned with the Pitt ministry's image.

As soon as

Monroe told Mulgrave that he'd decided to stay, the cabinet
immediately put off any decision on the subject. 42
For four years Jefferson and Madison had consistently
pursued a course of peaceful diplomacy.

They had worked to

keep the responses of their country and its government both
calm and rational.

Now, whether they liked it or not, that

was all to change.

With no talks in sight and the West

Indies profit gone Americans began to call for serious
action, even war.

CHAPTER V
THE TREATY OF 1806
Soon after Congress opened in December of 1805,
British charge Anthony Merry wrote of a tendency they had
to "combine the recent Detentions of American Ships with
the Impressment of American seamen."

In this way, he

concluded, Congress hoped "to excite universal Resentment
against us. " 1

He was absolutely correct..

The Ninth

Congress marked the end of a moderate American attitude
towards impressment.

The issue had been allowed to drag on

for too long and was now beginning to demand resolutione
Secretary of State Madison saw the solution in new
negotiation and the administration formulated a strategy of
economic coercion to push through its diplomatic agenda.
Madison advised Jefferson,
If a commercial weapon can be properly shaped
for the Executive hand, it is more and more
apparent to me that it can force all the nations
having colonies in this quarter of the globe to
respect our rights. 2
Madison's thoughts seemed aimed at an export embargo for
the West Indies designed to coerce England into relaxing
her regulations. 3

Within two months Monroe advised the

same·course of action.
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We shall get nothing from any but by force,
but ... with a subtle pressure, which however must
be unequivocal and decisive ... we may succeed in
what is right with any of them. " 4
This was an even stronger sentiment than Madison's and it
came from the man who was in almost all respects America's
ambassador to England.
Jefferson took the advice to heart.

In his message at

the opening of Congress he stated that:
the authority of reason ... imposes on us the
obligation of providing an effectual and
determined opposition to a doctrine so
injurious to the rights of peaceable nations." 5
The American government, even at the highest level, felt a
need, almost a compulsion, for action in the face of the
long standing difficulties with impressment.

These were

stronger words than had ever before been put to the
subject.

After the message had been read, Senator William

Plumer commented, "The message is more energetic and
warlike than any he (Jefferson] ever sent to Congress." 6
So it was readily apparent that the usually pacifist
Jefferson administration was rapidly reaching the end of
its rope.
The Jefferson administration was taking a tougher
approach.

Their plan called for sending Congress a special

anti-British message.

To be included was an October 15

1805 despatch from Monroe which contained a strong call for
coercive measures.

He warned that Britain intended "to

push their fortune in every practicable line at our
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expense."

Recent seizures of men and ships were simply

experiments to see how far Britain could push America
without retaliation.
If it succeeds, they will ... pursue the
advantage gained to the greatest extent in
all the relations susisting between the two
countries, more especially in the empressment
of our seamen.
Monroe recommended immediate pressure be placed on Britain
as her "colonies are dependent on us." 7

Only in this

manner, it was felt, could Britain's depredations be
stopped.
The message was planned for the second week of
January, 1806 but was delayed for several days. 8

The

reason appears to have been cold feet since Jefferson's
portion of the communique was considerably toned down by
the time of its release on the 17th.

Now, on impressment,

Jefferson would only say that U.S. "remonstrances had never
been intermitted." 9

This amounted to a statement that

though nothing had ever been done about impressment at
least America had never stopped complaining about it.
This was not a very strong message to send,
particularly considering the administration wanted to
persuade Congress to take decisive action.

It seems

probable that Jefferson felt Monroe's dispatch was bad
enough, and that Congress didn't need him to breathe fire
and brimstone as well.

Senator James Logan described the

dispatch as containing "a spirit of war and blood. " 10 and

49

John Quincy Adams felt it was "full of bitterness against
England, and urging strong and decisive measures. " 11
indeed it was.

Which

Adams later stated that, "Mr. Monroe was

known not to be friendly to England. " 12
qualify as a vast understatement.

Which would seem to

It would appear then,

that Jefferson was right to tone down his portion of the
missive lest Congress come up with more serious action than
he had planned for.

If this was the case then Jefferson

needed to tone his message down even more.
Representative Andrew Gregg of Pennsylvania surprised
the House with a resolution calling for total
non-importation of "goods, wares or merchandise, or the
growth, product or manufacture" 13 of Great Britain or her
colonies.

The next day, Samuel Smith submitted a

resolution proposing selective non-importation. 14

These two

sides quickly became the focus of intense discussion in the
Senate.

Uriah Tracy of Connecticut was "decidedly" against

non-importation as were George Logan and Abraham Baldwin of
Georgia.

These representatives of the eastern states

feared non-importation would hurt America as much as
Britain.

John Quincy Adams, generally on the side of the

administration, agreed.

Joseph Anderson of Tennessee

finally proposed to modify the resolution.

Adams drafted a

plan which now called for the President to send an envoy
extraordinary to London. 15
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The Senate called on the President "to demand and
insist upon" compensation for seizures "particularly
respecting the impressment of American seamen."

This

course of action was approved by the Senate February 5,
1806.16

Meanwhile, several more plans were brought up in the
House.

Joseph Clay of Pennsylvania proposed a "mild but

firm" ban "likely to induce Great Britain, in particular,
to recede from the unjust pretension she has set up. " 17

Any

country who refused to allow United States vessels into its
colonial ports would likewise be stopped from entering
American ports.

Jacob Crowninshield added a plan calling

or an embargo on all trade with Britain.

He explained:

We are merely about to prohibit the importation
of British goods in consequence of her having
seized our vessels ... and in consequence of her
seizure of American citizens protected by the
American flag . 18
He was not alone in calling for strong measures.

James

Sloan of New Jersey also called for an embargo until
Britain agreed to "equitable arrangement" 19 on impressment
and seizures.
None of these plans received serious consideratione
Instead, attention went to Joseph Nicholson's diplomatic
proposal of partial non-importation:
By laying a prohibition on the importation
of all articles received from Great Britain ... we
shall be laughed at ... for adopting a system
altogether impractical because we cannot adhere
to it.w
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Instead, his plan called for continuing the import of cheap
woolens, rum, salt and hardwares in an effort to cushion
the economic blow to American merchants.

The debate on

commercial restrictions quickly became one between Gregg's
total non-importation and Nicholson's partial plane
Madison and Jefferson were both in favor of limited
non-importation though they only spoke their views in
private.

John Quincy Adams reported on February 13, 1806:

(Madison's] system of proceeding towards Great
Britain is ... a retaliating navigation act; and
aggravated duties on articles imported from here
This is doubtless the President's favorite
policy. 21
Two weeks later he confirmed his assumption, writing, "I
dined at the President's ... His own preference is manifestly
for Nicholson's resolution. " 22

Jefferson and Madison were

unwilling to interfere directly in the day to day workings
of Congress, believing as strongly as they did in the
separation of the executive branch from the judicial and
the legislative.

Their usual method was to work through

favorably disposed allies in both houses.
Now, hoping to calm Congress, Jefferson sent a note
from Lord Mulgrave promising that the "American question"
would soon be settled.n
promise.

It turned out to be an empty

After a month went by with no further word from

Mulgrave, the administration finally sent a report on
imports and exports demanded by Congressman Randolph before
the House would consider Gregg's proposal.

This was
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typical of the Jefferson-Madison approach.

Neither man had

any real desire for war, or even to be much of a
hard-liner.

When they saw that a direct approach had

worked, as in securing the statement from Mulgrave, they
were often too quick to take the pressure off.

Then, when

the lessening in pressure caused results to drop off, they
would turn the heat up again.
On March 8, Madison sent the House a report on
impressments requested over two months before.

Three days

later he wrote Monroe that he and the President were still
"waiting with solicitude" 24 for the British cabinet's
promised reply.

Their patience was wearing thin.

Jefferson clearly felt it was time for some action.
The love of peace which we sincerely feel and
profess," he wrote on March 18, "has begun to
produce an opinion in Europe that our government
is entirely in Quaker principles ... This opinion
must be corrected when just occasion arises,
or we shall become the plunder of all nations. 25
It must be stressed that Jefferson said this in private,
apparently trusting that he had already goaded Congress
enough, if not too much.
Debate on Gregg's resolution ran from March 5 to March
13.

It soon became apparent only a minority supported full

nonimportation.

Gregg's proposal was defeated 70 to 47o 26

The House then spent four days debating Nicholson's plan
which passed on March 18 with a resounding 87 to 35 voteo 27
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This bill then passed the Senate on April 15 and Jefferson
signed it into law three days later

e

28

Congressional debate confirmed Phineas Bond's
observation of the tendency to merge the anti-British
complaints of seizures of American ships and impressment.
Gregg had placed impressment first among a long list of
grievances in his resolution.

Barnabas Bidwell noted in a

discussion on seizures that impressments were occurring at
a far greater rate than ever

before.~

Some extreme

Republicans even said they now accepted the possibility of
war with Great Britain as the only means of solving
America's problem, though they generally denied it would
have to go that far.

Instead, the resolve for war on

America's part would be sufficient to deter Great Britain. 30
Critics thought the uproar over impressments was
excessive and somewhat hollow.

Joseph Nicholson felt it

was "the carrying trade alone" that was responsible for
national outrage.
It was a matter of little surprise, that
gentlemen had so long slept upon a subject
[impressment], on which they now appeared to
manifest so much zeal ... Strong measures were
not then the order of the day, nor would they
be now, if the impressment of American seamen
was the only ground of complaint. 31
The crusade against impressment was, to him, a hoax.

Rufus

King was also against the extreme measures being taken
against impressment.

He felt the non-importation act was

designed to batter Britain into concessions.

King wrote
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Sir Francis Baring, a London banker, that the act "must
not ... occasion temper on the side of England.

The two

countries should be friends, and a captious temper should
not ... prevent them being so.''n

His use of the word

'captious' indicates that he too felt American anger to be
something of a sham.
Perhaps it is true that some men used the populist
issue of impressment to further their desires for
unrestricted trade with the British West Indies.

However,

the argument could also be made that men used the hard
economic issue of the carrying trade to force the
government to pay attention to their concerns about
impressment.

I believe Nicholson and King were wronge

At

this point many Americans seemed to feel affairs were at a
critical state.

Like Jefferson they believed acquiescence

was out of the question.

This is not to suggest that

Americans hungered for war.

At this point the course most

favored was negotiation backed with commercial sanctionso 33
To start the negotiations, Jefferson decided to send
an envoy extraordinary to London.
to take the job on March

13.~

William Pinckney agreed

The decision to send the

envoy was probably due to the arrival of some promising
news.

The Jefferson administration had learned of Prime

Minister Pitt's death and the new Grenville-Fox
administration in early February.

Monroe wrote Madison

that "the arrangement of the new Ministry was
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completed ... in the course of the last week.

It makes ... a

thorough change of character ... at least in respect to us.
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This news, coupled with the action in Congress could hardly
have helped but spark excitement.

Indeed, Jefferson wrote

in June:
Every communication from Mr. Monroe strengthens
our expectation that the new pretence of the
British to control our commerce with belligerents'
colonies will be properly restricted, and the
outrages on our seamen brought to an end. 36
However, neither Jefferson, Madison or Monroe ever thought
all obstacles to a settlement had been removed.

This

change in ministry was simply a favorable component.
By mid-1806 the re-export trade and impressment were
of paramount importance.

Madison wrote to Monroe and

Pinckney:
The importance of an effectual remedy for (the
impressment of American sailors], derives urgency
from the licentiousness with which it is still
pursued, and from the growing impatience of this
country under it.
This plainly illustrates why the Jefferson administration
was hedging their bets, even though the Grenville-Fox
ministry was friendly to the United States.
was still occurring, and often.

Impressment

Madison continued:

So indispensable is some adequate provision
for [impressment], that the President makes
it a necessary preliminary to any stipulation
requiring a repeal of the Act shutting the
market of the U. States against certain British
manufactures.n
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This was not political opportunism, but a genuine
reflection of the strength of feeling excited by
impressment in this country.

Judge John Tyler wrote to

Jefferson, "I would rather not exist as a man or nation
than to suffer such violations of the rights and liberty of
our fellow citizens. 1138

A week later Wilson Cary Nicholas

advised that, "the impressment of our seamen is a thing
that the honor, the feelings and the interest of the United
States calls aloud upon the government to put an end to .. " 39
Clearly there was a great deal of anger on the subject
which Jefferson would have been ill-advised to ignore.
Britain's new government did want good relations with
America, but not at the expense of vital British interestso
After Monroe re-opened discussions on impressment on
February 25, the new Admiralty board responded with a very
old argument.

The American proposal "would, if adopted, be

attended with the most pernicious, if not fatal
consequences to His Majesty's naval Service.
been the Royal Navy's response for years.
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This had

As always, the

need for impressment reflected a shortage of sailors.
navy had continued to expand throughout 1806.

The

In January

of 1806 Britain possessed 590 ships and 111,237 sailors.
By January of 1807 the navy consisted of 650 ships and
119,855 sailors. 41

Thus, though the number of sailors had

risen, the per capita number of sailors per ship had
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dropped.

With France attempting to take over all of

Europe, Britain needed every sailor she could grab.
To compound problems, Fox fell fatally ill three days
after Pinckney arrived in London.

Lord Auckland, an ally

of Lord Grenville's with long diplomatic experience, was
chosen to take Fox's place in negotiation with the
Americans. 42

This was not necessarily good news.

Jefferson

was afraid Auckland was "too much wedded to the antient
maritime code and principles of

England.''~

This because of

the Lord's long-time service in the diplomatic arena.
Auckland seemed to bear this opinion out, when, at his
introductory dinner, he declared, "I trust we shall be able
to do some good to mankind, if your powers are sufficiently
extensive.""

Which was not exactly extending the olive

branch.
However, to the Americans there still remained a ray
of hope.
nephew.

Also assigned was Henry Vassal Holland, Fox's
Early in 1806, Monroe had reported that Holland

had written a pamphlet expressing "very liberal sentiments
toward the United States.''~

The Jefferson administration

hoped that Holland would extend a mitigating influence on
Auckland whom they expected to be intractable.
With the new British team settled negotiation began
again on September first.

As talks commenced it became

clear that the British would be hewing closer to Auckland's
point of view than Holland's.

Still, there was a sign of
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compromise.

The British negotiators referred to

impressment as "extremely delicate and embarrassing."

They

requested to know "precisely" what the United States would
put in a treaty to guarantee the restoration of British
sailors.

It was their fear that the American plan would

turn United States merchant ships into "receptacles for
deserters."

They themselves "felt the strongest

repugnance" to a renunciation of the right to impress "such
seamen as should appear to be their own subjects."

They

suggested instead that America issue "authentic documents
of citizenship" whose form would be settled by treaty" and
would "completely protect those to whom they related. " 46
Though this was a significant concession the talks soon
stalled.

The Americans, always leery of this sort of

paperwork, found "that it was besides impossible that we
should acknowledge in favor of any foreign power ... such
jurisdiction on board our vessels ... as this sort of
impressment implied. " 47

Monroe and Pinckney seemed to fear

that the British negotiators were trying to catch them in a
game of 'slip-up'.

A mistaken word could then lead to

Britain claiming that America had acknowledged Britain's
basic right to impress sailors.
Meanwhile, Auckland had received alleged examples of
fraudulent American protections from the Admiralty.

He

showed these documents to the Americans and "insisted much
on the difficulty which this notorious Practice would raise
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in framing any Article for the due security ... of the
British Navy."

It was a legitimate concern, yet, despite

their apparent reservations, Auckland and Holland set out
the American plan for the cabinet's consideration.

They

did, however, recommend that "whatever arrangements may be
thought advisable or expedient on this Subject" be
temporary "so that its defects may eventually be
reconsidered and rectified. " 48

After this advice, a sort of

diplomatic buckling of safety belts, the British
negotiators told Monroe and Pinckney "that the several
considerations had been sufficiently discussed, to be laid
immediately before the King's Ministers for further
instructions. " 49

The four men agreed to adjourn until

November fifth.
When the cabinet finally sat to discuss the proposal
it was November fourth.

They agreed only that if any

article was to be adopted the right to impressment itself
had to be preserved "in Status Quo by express Saving
Provisos. " 50

In other words, no deal.

Though initially rejecting Britain's 'counter
proposal', Monroe and Pinckney gave in to British requests
to continue negotiations.

Auckland drafted a note to the

Americans immediately, promising:
that instructions have been given and shall
be repeated and enforced; for the observance
of the greatest caution in the impressing of
British seamen; and that the strictest care
shall be taken to preserve the citizens of the
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United States from any molestation or injury;
and that immediate and prompt redress shall be
afforded upon any representation of injury
sustained by them. 51
Which did nothing to solve the problem but was certainly
very polite.

In fact, the British had been being polite in

this manner for some years already, so this assurance
really meant nothing.
A full treaty was finally signed by the American team
on New Year's Eve, however, there was a formal silence on
impressment.~

On February 3, Madison wrote the

negotiators:
If no satisfactory or formal stipulation on
the subject of impressment be obtainable the
negotiation should be made to terminate without
any formal compact whatever, but with mutual
understanding, founded on friendly and liberal
discussions and explanations, that in practice
each party will entirely conform to what may
be thus informally settled. 53
At this time, of course, he had no knowledge of the already
signed treaty.

Still, from his words we find his reaction

on March 3, when the treaty did arrive, unsurprising.

When

Madison saw it contained nothing on impressment he said
that "he did not think it would be possible to ratify the
Treaty, without an Article that should satisfactorily
provide for the Object. " 54

That 'object' was, naturally,

the end of impressment.
Jefferson rejected the treaty as well.H

This

rejection marked the end of friendly Anglo-American
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relations for years to come.

The next phase began a slow

downward spiral that led finally to war.

CHAPTER VI
THE CHESAPEAKE-LEOPARD ENCOUNTER
Administration leaders spent the Spring of 1807 trying
to think of a way to get Britain to make concessions on
impressment.

On March 17, Madison urged a plan to renounce

the use of British sailors in the American carrying trade. 1
Albert Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, began to
examine the possible impact of this renunciation.

He found

that at least 9,000 of the 69,000 sailors in the United
States navy and merchant marine were British.

Gallatin

warned that Madison's proposal could "materially injure"
American commerce and navigation "much more" than "any
restrictions" the British government could lay "supposing
no treaty to take place."
great for the object."

The sacrifice would be "too

He would only recommend Madison's

plan if a failure to procure a treaty would "lead to
hostilities, or to a state of things equivalent thereto.
Again, the primary consideration was commerce.
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The only

thing that could hurt trade more than impressment was the
loss of 9,000 British sailors and the only thing worse than
that was out and out war.
Madison was forced to agree that Gallatin's numbers
had to "command just attention."

He proposed instead to
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renounce the services of all British sailors except those
with more than two years outside their own country's
services.

He wrote to Jefferson that General Henry

Dearborn, the Secretary of War, and Robert Smith, the
Secretary of the Navy, were, "willing to go to great
lengths on this subject.
is ... urgent.

The case of impressment

Something seems essential to be done, nor is

anything likely to be done without carrying fresh matter
into the negotiation." 3

Unfortunately this came on the

heels of Gallatin's statement.

The Jefferson

administration was no longer ready to take what seemed
drastic action.

Jefferson replied, "On the subject of the

British treaty ... the more it is developed the worse it
appears." 4

The President felt the number of British

sailors in American employ made it:
prudent ... to drop the idea of any proposition
not to employ them. The best course is to let
the negotiation take a friendly nap and endeavor
in the meantime to practice on such of its
principles as are mutually acceptable. 5
America, it seemed, could not afford to renounce British
sailors any more than Britain could renounce impressment.
Madison, at this point, began to "suspect" that the treaty
would have to be limited to the "subject of Impressments,
leaving the Colonial Trade with other objects to their own
course."

He continued to push his views, however,

recommending "fresh concessions" be made. 6
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The advice was not followed.

The administration as

angered by the human tragedy of impressment but they were
not ready to destroy American commerce over it.

In the

instructions to Monroe and Pinckney finished on May 20,
only the proposal to prohibit employment of those with less
than two years service survived.

This was now to be

offered only "in the event of a rejection of every
arrangement already authorized."

If Britain rejected this

final offer, Monroe and Pinckney were to refer the problem
back to Washington.

However, it was hoped that talks could

be made as long as possible.

As Madison said,

As long as negotiation can be honorably
protracted, it is a resource to be preferred,
under existing circumstances, to the preemptory
alternative of improper concessions or inevitable
collisions.
The feeling seemed to be that as long as the two countries
were talking they at least weren't at war.

At the same

time, Madison refused to aid the British in recovering
their deserters from American ships.

He claimed America

and Britain had no treaty requiring restitution of
deserters. 7

This stance was used as a carrot on a stick to

help Madison reach his goal of a combined treaty to end
impressment at sea and recover British deserters.
Britain, of course, was not disposed to drop
impressment, and Madison's proposals fell, not
surprisingly, on deaf ears.

All this work with so little
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progress helped to create a tense atmosphere and eventually
led to the attack on the Chesapeake.
In December, 1806, British minister David Erskine went
to Madison about the case of several deserters from a
British ship who were being sheltered in Bostono

Madison

refused to help, saying again that:
as no existing article of the Treaty between
Great Britain and the United States [Jay's
Treaty] gave any authority to the Government
of the United States to exercise such a power,
they did not dare interfere. 8
Clearly, he was still hoping to attach this issue to that
of impressment.

On February 1, 1807, Madison tried again

to tempt Erskine, telling him that a formal treaty would
produce a situation where "every Facility would be afforded
by the Government and the People" for the recovery of
British deserters.
restored." 9

He claimed "a great many would be

Of course nothing was done and the whole

situation sat on pins and needles, an accident waiting to
happen.
In early January five sailors had fled from the H.M.S.
Melampus, anchored near Hampton, Virginia. 10

Thomas Hall

Parker, Mayor of Norfolk, refused to deliver the men since
neither federal nor state law had provisions for such
cases. 11

Secretary of the Navy, Robert Smith, listed the

deserters who were now alleged to be on t he Chesapeake and
ordered recruiting officers "in no case to enter deserters
from British ships of war."

Commodore James Barron,
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captain of the Chesapeake, replied that three of the
deserters were on his ship but were undoubtedly Americans
pressed into the Royal Navy . 12

British naval officers soon

put together their own theory of American behavior.
Captain J.E. Douglas wrote on April 15 saying refusal to
ratify the Treaty of 1806 was
only a Finesse on their part, to prevent His
Majesty's Ministers applying for the many
Thousand British Subjects employed in the
Navigation of the Vessels of the United
States." 13
That this was untrue is obvious but it is an illustration
of the anger and frustration felt within the British navy
over American conduct.
Admiral George Berkeley, in command of the British
ships on the North American station, reported to the
Admiralty that "the open and avowed protection" given to
British deserters necessitated "some explanation from the
American government."

British officers who tried to get

their men back were often subject to "the most glaring
insults" from the local populace. 14
Berkeley was reaching his limit.

Clearly, Admiral
On May 31, he discovered

that one of his ships, the Driver, had been expelled from
Charlestown under threat of attack.

It was the last straw.

The next day Berkeley ordered his commanders to search for
the British deserters known to be on the Chesapeake. 15
Captain Douglas, anchored within sight of the
Chesapeake assigned the search to the Leopard, a ship
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nearly equal to the Chesapeake.

He had a much larger ship

at his call, the Bellona, and had it searched the
Chesapeake an honor-bound American resistance might have
been averted.

Such was not to be the case.

Late in the afternoon of June 22, the Leopard
intercepted the Chesapeake and asked permission to send
over a boat carrying dispatches.
the request was granted.

This was not unusual and

When the boat arrived, however,

the British lieutenant in charge gave Commodore Barron a
note from the Captain of the Leopard along with a copy of
Berkeley's orders and then demanded the British deserters.
Barron refused and before the Chesapeake's decks could be
cleared for action the Leopard had fired a warning shot and
then a broadside into the frigate.

After fifteen minutes

of fire from the Leopard, the Chesapeake surrendered and
the British boarding party returned and took four suspected
deserters. 16
The sight of the damaged frigate and news of three
dead and eighteen wounded among her crew set off a violent
chain reaction along the East coast.

In Norfolk a crowd

rioted and destroyed water casks from two of the British
ships in Chesapeake Bay. 17

New Yorkers attackers and

heavily damaged a British ship.

Editor Thomas Ritchie of

the Richmond Enquirer called upon the President to convene
Congress to decide on the issue of war. 18

War was

definitely an option and the fear was that the American
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public rather than the America government would make the
decision.

Jefferson advised restraint in the vicinity of

Norfolk so that any decision could be left to Congress. 19
Three days later the cabinet banned all British warships
from American waters and sent the aptly named Revenge to
England to demand a disavowal of the attack, restoration of
the men and the recall of Admiral Berkeley.w
Public response in America was mostly anger.

At a

public meeting in Baltimore, Senator Samuel Smith called
for "War-in case ... satisfaction is not given." 21 though this
sounded as if the Senator was standing tall, the reality
was that satisfaction was almost certainly forthcoming.
Still, from the reactions of many Americans, this seems to
be a fact many people were not sure of.

Jefferson's

friend, Wilson Cary Nicholas said he was ready to
"encounter war" since there was "no spirit which ought to
be cherished with so much care by those who govern a young
country as national pride and a regard to national honor .. " 22
And Congressman James G. Jackson of West Virginia feared
that "tame submission to such outrages" would "disgrace the
Government and its Friends" paving the way for despotism ..
It began to look as if Jefferson were suffering a crisis of
decision, or even worse, was afraid to take action.
was not the case.

This

Throughout July the president reminded

his correspondents that the common usage of nations
required America to give Britain a chance to make
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reparations.

Besides, American merchant and war ships

would be left vulnerable if war were so suddenly declared. 24
For all Jefferson's words the tension continued.
After the destruction of the water casks, on July 8,
British Captain Douglas blockaded Chesapeake Bay. 25
a dangerous move.

It was

Jefferson advised the Secretary of War

that "the British commanders have their foot on the
threshold of war. " 26
conflict.

It seemed that there might indeed be a

The crisis only began to abate on July 11 when

Jefferson learned that the attack on the Chesapeake was not
the result of prior orders from London.

still, it was not

until the fifteenth, when Douglas calmed down and dropped
the blockade, that the danger of war passed.n
At this point American demands for redress for the
attack on the Chesapeake changed.
Berkeley was dropped.

The recall of Admiral

Now the administration demanded

"security for the future" to be achieved through "an entire
abolition of impressments from vessels under the flag of
the United States."

This was hoped to be made possible

"without the authorized rejection from the service of the
United States of British seamen who have not been two years
in it.
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This would appear to be a case of America feeling

they were one-up on England and now in a position to press
their demands while making no corresponding concessions of
their own.
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Meanwhile, public sentiment began to drift away from
war.

Albert Gallatin wrote Madison that New Yorkers "do

not appear to me to be in favor of war."

By this time,

though, the immediate danger of war had passed.

Canning

wrote Monroe on July 25, assuring him that the British
Government would give "the most prompt and effectual
Reparation" if the British government was found to be the
aggressor.

The Foreign Secretary also said, however, that

he was "not at present enabled to communicate" any
particulars. 30

Monroe, at this point, knew absolutely

nothing of the Chesapeake incident and wouldn't hear from
the United States government for over a month.

Though he

had to be somewhat mystified he thanked Canning for the
assurance that "this unfortunate occurrence was not
authorized by his majesty's government.
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Two days later, Monroe learned of the attack from news
accounts.

On July 29 he met with Canning and brought up

the attack on the Chesapeake.

He asked the cabinet to

admit the incident was "a flagrant abuse" of authority and
to give Washington "a frank disavowal of the principle on
which it was made.
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Which meant give up impressment ..

Unfortunately for Monroe the cabinet wasn't as sure about
the incident as he was.

After all, America had twice

refused to return identified deserters.

It hardly seemed

the sort of mishap designed to get Britain to renounce a
practice they had been doggedly hanging on to for
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centuries.

Canning replied to Monroe on August 3, assuring

him "that His Majesty neither does or has maintained ... a
right to search ships of war ... for deserters ... If it shall
appear that the (attack] rested on no other grounds" than a
right to search foreign warships, the British government
would have "no difficulty is disavowing that act. " 33

The

wording here indicates the British government felt
reasonably sure that there would be some sort of
extenuating circumstances.
The next month Canning decided to announce a Royal
Proclamation which would repeat the renunciation of a right
to search foreign warships, while announcing Britain's
intention to continue impressment from merchant ships on
the high seas.~

Canning had already spoken of the idea

with Monroe in early September and had been told that the
American envoy was forbidden to separate reparations for
the Chesapeake from the demand to end high seas
impressment. 35

Monroe followed this refusal by submitting a

formal demand for reparations and for the end of
impressment.
hold. 36

Canning's proclamation had to be put on

The British cabinet instead announced an intention

to send a special minister to America to settle reparations
on t he Chesapeake.

This note was delivered to Monroe on

September 23, in it Canning refused to handle the
Chesapeake and impressment issues together. 37
very high-handed to the Americans.

This seemed

On October 19, Monroe
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and Pinckney asked Canning if the proclamation with its
insistence on separation of the Chesapeake from impressment
was designed to "shut the door against negotiation and
concession."

Canning replied that it was merely intended

to state the British position.

At the same time he also

made it clear that Britain would not retreat from the
practice of impressment:
He said ... that he ought not to leave us under
the impression that there was any prospect that
the Government of Great Britain could recede
from its declared pretensions r~lative to
searching on the high seas the merchant ships
of neutral nations for British seamen. 38
This left the Americans very little room to maneuver and
when Canning formally terminated negotiations on October 22
it came as little surprise.
Jefferson now began to prepare for the possibility of
war.

He first ordered a line beyond which British ships

would not be allowed to pass.

He then used his annual

message to Congress for a powerful attack on England.
"With the other nations of Europe our harmony has been
uninterrupted, and commerce and friendly intercourse have
been maintained on their usual footing."

Great Britain,

however, threatened the "peace and prosperity" of the
nation.

Now America would have to "restrain wrong by

resistance. 1140

These were by far the harshest words

Jefferson had yet used, a virtual call for war.

Yet on

October 26, the National Intelligencer, a government
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mouthpiece, offered a choice between war or "surer
reparation through the medium of commercial regulation. " 41
Clearly, if Jefferson had been contemplating war he had
changed his mind.

It is even possible that he never

planned for war and was only trying to gain leverage at the
bargaining table.
On December 14, His Majesty's Royal Proclamation of
October 17 reached America.

It was not received favorably.

On December 17, Jefferson drafted a recommendation that
Congress put an embargo on all American shipping. 42

This

recommendation was sent to the Senate the same night.
The communications now made, showing the great
and increasing dangers with which our vessels,
our seamen and merchandise, are threatened on the
high seas and elsewhere from the belligerent powers
of Europe, and it being of the greatest importance
to keep in safety these essential resources, I deem
it my duty to recommend the subject to the
consideration of Congress, who will doubtless
preceive all the advantages which may be expected
from an inhibition of the departure of our vessels
from the ports of the United States.~
This was probably the strongest measure Jefferson could
have taken without actually pushing for a declaration of
war.

Congress was in apparent agreement as they passed the

Embargo Act in just four days.

When Jefferson signed it

into law he was admitting his policy of negotiation had
failed.

He had fallen back as his last resort on

non-importation and embargo as the last peaceful means of
supporting America's ongoing quest for concessions.

CHAPTER VII
IMPRESSMENT TAKES A BACK SEAT, 1807-1812
Late in 1807 attention began to turn away from
impressment towards British and French attacks on neutral
commerce.

President Jefferson noted, "The decrees and

orders of the belligerent nations ... amounted nearly to a
declaration that they would take our vessels wherever
found." 1

Jefferson was referring to Britain's problematic

Orders in Council, passed November 11, 1807.

This order

prohibited under pain of capture, trade with any part of
the European continent under French control, which was most
everything.

Britain had passed the decree in response to

similar measures, the Berlin and Milan Decrees, passed by
Napoleon.

It is easy to see that having entire ships

seized was a problem that outweighed having a few members
of the crew taken away.

For the next three years

impressment lacked major importance as a political issue,
but the practice continued unabated.

Requests for the

'

release of sailors are the only guide to the number of men
taken.

Four hundred and ninety-eight men were impressed in

1807 while 514 were impressed in 1808.

By 1810 the number

had jumped to 1,047 and in the first nine months of 1812
another 830 releases were requested. 2
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Though United States diplomats sometimes broached the
subject, their attitudes were changeable.

Albert Gallatin

told British special envoy George Henry Rose in March,
1808, that "nothing of a real difficulty remained between
the Two Countries but His Majesty's Orders in Council .. "
Rose noted that Gallatin repeated this statement "dwelling
upon the word 'nothing' with particular emphasis." 3

But in

August, 1809, Gallatin wrote David Erskine that there was
little chance of an Anglo-American treaty without an
agreement on impressment. 4

This change in attitude may

have been caused by the failure of British-American
negotiations.

Only days after the United States embargo

had been passed, George Rose arrived to discuss reparations
for the Chesapeake.

The Jefferson administration

immediately agreed to separate this issue from
impressment. 5
Though Rose's mission was in the end a failure it did
cause this change in American policy.

Madison's new

instructions to William Pinckney told him,
You are authorized ... in the event of a repeal
of the British orders, and of satisfactory pledges
for repairing the aggression on the Chesapeake,
to enter into informal arrangements for abolishing
impressments. 6
This indicates a new order of priority, with impressment
clearly taking the back seat to the Orders.
The temptation is to blame collapse of negotiations on
American intransigence, the stubborn insistence on linking
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impressment to other diplomatic issues.

In this case,

however, the Royal Proclamation of October 17, 1807, seemed
to bar further negotiation.

Jefferson admitted, "A

proclamation of that Government (Britain] ... seems to have
shut the door on all negotiation with us.
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David Erskine

wrote to London the day after Jefferson signed the embargo
act warning that the Proclamation had convinced the
Jefferson administration that Britain was unwilling to make
major concessions. 8

Not for the first time, the news fell

on deaf ears.
One reason for the administration's lessening of
impressment's importance could have been the waning of
public interest.

Only occasionally after 1807 did outrage

at impressments hit the papers. 9

Congress was like-minded,

rarely discussing the issue, and generally favoring
commercial sanctions as retaliation for the more important
Orders in Council through November, 1811.
Dislike had grown toward the embargo, however, and
Congress turned to a less severe measure.
became law in May, 1810.

Macon's Bill #2

Repeal by one of the belligerents

of its commercial restrictions had to be followed in ninety
days by repeal of its enemies' decrees or non-intercourse
would be sustained against the continuing offender.
Napoleon repealed the Berlin and Milan Decrees towards
America on November 2, 1810.

On that day the United States

government told Pinckney to notify Britain that they had
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ninety days to revoke the Orders in Council.

Britain

refused, denying the French Decrees had been truly repealed
since they had only been relaxed towards America.

Congress

then legislated a new non-intercourse act with Great
Britain to begin March 1, 1811. 10
Even after this set back, President Madison still
thought there was a good possibility of settling the issueo
Lord Holland [is] Prime Minister ... a new
parliament (is] to be called ... It is highly
probable that some natural change in the general
policy of the (British] Government in relation
to this country ... will result." 11
His Secretary of State, James Monroe, was also hopeful for
peace claiming he would be "most happy indeed" if the
divisive issues could be settled on "reasonable and
satisfactory grounds. " 12

This new administration was still

operating within the framework of Jefferson's previous
policy.

War was damaging to commerce and something to be

avoided if at all possible.
agreed.

Congress, for the moment,

In February, 1811, a vote on a resolution

demanding an end to impressment and the revoking of the
Orders in Council failed, gathering only 21 votes out of
104. 13

Yet despite this apparent goodwill, the British were

taking no chances.

John P. Marier, the British charge

d'affairs, wrote to Sir Herbert Sawyer, the new Commander
of the North American Station in May, 1811:
The subject of impressment has always been
one by which the feeling of this nation has
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been kept alive in its animosity against Great
Britain ... Were I to venture to give an opinion
on the subject of impressment in general, it
would be for ... its abandonment in practice ...
because I am confident that no possible advantage
which can accrue to the service ... can compensate
for the evil which a constant state of irritation
between the two nations must create. 14
Hoping that an Admiral would agree with his opinion was
wishful thinking on Mr. Morier's part, however, in a short
time his assessment was to prove correct.
The new British minister to America, Augustus John
Foster, arrived in Washington on June 30, 1811.

From

President Madison's earlier remarks on the new British
cabinet it would seem hopes were riding high that new
negotiations would prove fruitful.

Indeed, Monroe began

talks three days after Foster's arrival, but impressment
was ignored in favor of the French Decrees and the Orders
in Council. 15

Unfortunately, Foster had been instructed to

give very little in the upcoming talks.
Altho' it is the anxious desire of His Royal
Highness ... to avoid a rupture with the United
States of America ... It is also expedient that
the American Govt. should be made sensible, of
the great extent of the means, which this Country
possess, of affecting the commerce and industry
of the United States ... Without resorting to the
extremity of war ... you will use your discretion
in suggesting these considerations ... at the
time ... which may appear most convenient and
useful. 16
Though he did not use these suggested threats, Foster did,
on his own initiative, attempt to explain how the
government had been duped by the French.

u.s&

He hoped that
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through his efforts "the delusions attempted by the
Government of France have now been made manifest and the
perfidious plans of its ruler exposed." 17
in vain.

These hopes were

Monroe, unwilling to give an inch on the subject,

attacked the British position point by point.

Foster's

only reply to this long and detailed rebuttal was to ask if
the President would now "rest satisfied with the partial
repeal of the Berlin and Milan Decrees? 1118

The flippant

reply surely angered Monroe and Madison who were obviously
quite satisfied with partial repeal as long as it was
America's portion that was repealed.

Madison concluded

that Foster was "more disposed to play the diplomatist,
than the conciliatory negotiator.

1119

The negotiations,

which America had held out such high hopes for, were at an
impasse.
During the last four months of 1811, Madison and
Monroe wrote often of the likelihood of war.

Monroe wrote

his friend, Lord Holland, claiming he had entered office
"with the best disposition to promote ... an accommodation of
all differences" which he claimed was also "unquestionably
the wish of the President."

Unfortunately, he continued,

Britain only gave "evidence of a determined hostility" to
American rights.

Monroe accused Britain of trying "to push

things to the worst" and implied that America now had its
back to the wall.

"War, dreadful as the alternative is,

could not do us more injury and it would certainly be more
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honorable to the nation. " 2

For his part, Madison wrote

John Quincy Adams, sounding much like Thomas Jefferson
before him:
The question to be decided ... by Congress,
according to present appearances, simply is,
whether all the trade to which the orders
[in council] are and shall be applied, is to
be abandoned, or the hostile operation of [the
orders in council], be hostilely resisted. 21
This was a dramatic turn about from the beginning of the
year and shows just how great the disappointment in the
failed negotiations was.
Madison's message at the opening of the new Congress
was accordingly designed to convince the British ministers
that the Orders in Council needed to be immediately
revoked.

In the speech Madison warned that, "The period is

arrived which claims from the legislative guardians of the
national rights a system of more ample provisions for
maintaining them."

As reasons for this he stressed the

Orders though he also spoke of "other wrongs, so long and
so loudly calling for" a remedy; a reference to
impressment.

Great Britain, he said, remained firm in

"hostile inflexibility" and thus America had to put itself
"into an armor and an attitude demanded by the crisis, and
corresponding with the national spirit and expectation."
He recommended Congress "augment the regular military,
strengthen the state militias, build up the navy and secure
and store arms and munitions. " 22

Despite the tone of the
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message it seems probable that even at this point Madison
had no real desire for war but was instead simply trying to
show the British that America meant business.
Pushed by war hawks, Congress passed the requested
military legislation, though some members were still
hesitant. 23

Senator George W. Campbell of Tennessee said

America had "suffered national degradation too long, and
endured insult and injury with too much patience."

It was

"extremely difficult to perceive how war can be avoided
without degrading the national character still lower than
it is.''M

This was typical of the pro-war sentiments which

often reflected upon a loss of national honor if action
were not soon taken.

Congressman Richard Johnson of

Kentucky took this argument to its ultimate extreme when he
claimed that America "must now oppose the further
encroachment of Great Britain by war or formally annul the
Declaration of Independence, and acknowledge ourselves her
devoted colonies."~

That this extreme, and somewhat

ludicrous, statement was greeted with utter solemnity
indicates how far towards war the pendulum had swung.

A

week later, Peter Porter, chair of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, recommended America go to war unless
Britain rescinded the Orders in Council and agreed to "some
satisfactory arrangements" on impressment.M

In the

government, Rufus King was virtually alone in his belief
that France had proceeded "to mislead a nation torn asunder
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by faction and blinded to her most important interests. " 27
This was, however, a reiteration of the British point of
view, which was unpopular in Washington at this time.
Impressment, as the statement by Peter Porter shows,
was again becoming an issue, though this time because it
helped fan the flames of war.

Senator Felix Grundy claimed

impressment was "over and above the unjust pretensions" of
the Orders in Council.

Henry Clay said he could

not ... overlook the impressment of our seamen; an aggression
upon which he never reflected without feelings of
indignation, which would not allow him appropriate language
to describe its enormity. " 29

This was undoubtedly a true

sentiment, but Clay also knew that impressment was a
volatile subject which could be used to stir general public
indignation against England.
Realizing what was happening, foreign minister Foster
wrote back to Lord Castlereagh, warning him that,
Very inflammatory paragraphs ... on the subject of
impressment have lately been circulated in the
American papers, and as the causes of war become
more closely canvassed ... impressment seems to be
dwelt upon with considerable vehemence. 1130
Once more, there is no indication that this warning has
taken into consideration.

No action was taken upon ito

By early 1812 the Madison administration had all but
given up on a peaceful solution.

The President could see

nothing in the conduct of Great Britain to indicate
anything but "an adherence to her mad policy towards the
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United States."

The combination of pro-war politics in

Congress and lack of positive action from London helped
contribute to Madison's new bleaker view of affairs.

Then,

on March 20, Minister Foster received new instructions.
Unfortunately they changed nothing.

"Honor and interest"

required the Orders in Council to be "executed by forceo

11

American arms "must be met by British Cruizers according to
the necessity of the case. " 32

With these words Britain's

last opportunity to avert the oncoming crisis was lost.

On

receipt of these new orders Madison wrote to Jefferson that
since Great Britain seemed to "prefer" war, America had
"nothing left, therefore, but to make ready for ito
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Congress agreed and quickly passed a new embargo bill
proposed by Henry Clay. 34

America was set on the road to

war.
Monroe immediately began to stress impressment in an
effort to underscore Britain's guilt, he described England
as "[taking] the lead in the career of violence and
injustice" and specified impressments.~

Again, the subject

was used as a shortcut for getting the American public
primed for the upcoming battle.
Foster received yet another set of instructions, this
time from the new foreign secretary, Robert Stewart, but
these were as disappointing as the last set.
claimed France had only made:

Stewart
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some partial and insidious relaxations of [the
Berlin and Milan Decrees] ... as an encouragement
to America to adopt a system beneficial to France
and injurious to Great Britain.
Britain, despite assurance of war with America, was not
going to budge from its original position.

Madison

believed that this position was that the Orders in Council
would be repealed in relation to America if France did
likewise.

Now the foreign secretary claimed Britain had

"never engaged to repeal those Orders, as affecting America
alone, leaving them in force against other States.
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In

other words, France would have to drop her Decrees against
all nations before Britain would do likewise.

Years later,

Madison confided that it was at this point "no choice
remained but between war and degradation.
argue with him.
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It is hard to

The only way for America to placate Great

Britain would have been to convince France to drop her
decrees against England, an action which would have gained
France absolutely nothing.

Avenues of escape seemed

exhausted, there· was only one road left to travel.
In his message of June 1, 1812, Madison recommended
consideration of "whether the United States shall continue
passive under these progressive usurpations and these
accumulated wrongs."

His list of grievances included the

Orders in Council and impressment.

"Against this crying

enormity which Great Britain would be so prompt to avenge
if committed against herself, the United States have in
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vain exhausted remonstrances and expostulations. " 38
speech was the last little push needed.

The

Not surprisingly,

the House declared war on Great Britain on June 4. 39
By emphasizing impressment the administration
committed itself to a peace which settled
issue.

the impressment

The Committee on Foreign Relations indicated on

June 3, that it made sense to do so.

If the practice

continued it would be "impossible for the United States to
consider themselves an independent nation. 1140

The

administration was ready to back those words to the hilt.
Shortly after the Senate declared war, Monroe sent the
government's terms to Jonathan Russell, the charge
d'affairs in London.

Before there could be peace Britain

had to end impressment and restore all impressed American
sailors.

There could be no compromise. 41

CHAPTER VIII
EPILOGUE, 1812-1818
Wartime diplomacy focused on impressment since it
almost immediately became the only reason for the fighting.
On June 23, 1812, just twelve days after America declared
war, Britain's foreign secretary announced revocation of
the Orders in Council. 1

It had been hoped this would

convince America to cease hostilities but the Madison
administration, perhaps flushed with their quick diplomatic
victory, pushed for the repeal of impressment. 2
Late in the fall of 1812, Monroe and Albert Gallatin
drafted a bill to disallow the use of British sailors on
American merchant ships.

America would renounce the use of

foreign sailors if their country of origin did the same for
Americans.

The measure would not affect foreign sailors

already naturalized or in the process of naturalization
before the end of the war. 3

This bill passed both houses

of Congress after debate, near the end of February, 1813G 4
However, Lord Castlereagh, once again the foreign
secretary, continued to stress the impossibility of
renouncing impressment. 5

He instructed his commissioners

on July 28, 1814, "to ascertain whether the American
negotiators have any specific measures to propose for
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obviating the alleged abuses of which they complain."
Apparently the bill renouncing foreign sailors didn't
count.

Castlereagh then claimed his government would

"weigh" American proposals "dispassionately ... with a desire
to conciliate."

Yet he also emphasized that Britain could:

never recede from the principle of holding
their own subjects to their duty of allegiance.
The right of [impressment] can never be given
up ... in exchange for any municipal regulation. 6
The American bill, then, was not specific enough.
Impressment remained a subject on which Britain would not
give an inch.
It turned out they wouldn't have to.

By the time

these instructions were printed America had abandoned its
sine qua non on impressment allowing its negotiators to
accept a treaty silent on the issue.
reversal of the earlier position.

This was a dramatic

In early 1813, Monroe

had sent his instructions, demanding Britain abandon
impressment at sea.

To let the topic pass in silence would

be to give up "all claim to neutral rights, and all other
rights on the Ocean."

A month later Monroe added that a

silence which trusted "to a mere understanding ... would not
be that security which the United States have a right to
expect.
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Madison's attitude is unsurprising; at this

point the war was young and America knew that Britain was
in virtual isolation in its war with France.
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When, on June 24, 1814, President Madison asked the
cabinet if they wanted to drop the sine qua non they were
against it.

Soon after news came of the firm stand Britain

was taking on impressment as well as the collapse of
Napoleon.

On the 27th the cabinet voted unanimously to

accept silence on the issue. 8

Clearly their anger toward

impressment did not extend to facing the British navy
alone.
For their part, the American negotiators at Ghent,
Albert Gallatin, John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, James A.
Bayard and Jonathan Russell, had always been in doubt about
the wisdom of the sine qua non.

Adams had argued that it

would be best to "leave the question just where it is,
saying nothing about it. " 9

When the Americans learned that

Britain agreed not to ask for positive approval of
impressment they quickly let the entire issue drop.

The

peace treaty was signed on Christmas Eve, 1814, bypassing
impressment entirely.
Yet the issue refused to die.
exile on Elba in March, 1815.

Napoleon returned from

Britain, fearing a new

Anglo-French war, again began pressing United States
sailors, risking American wrath.

In June, Castlereagh told

Adams that "the Admiralty was now occupied in prescribing
regulations for the naval officers which he hoped would
prevent all cause of complaint. " 10

The British fear was

that their practice would again lead to war, but such was
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not the case.

When Madison proposed new legislation

limiting the use of British sailors as a spur for
negotiation, Congress balked.

In February, 1815 the matter

was put off to the next session and in December it was
allowed to die. 11

It seems that America had never truly

intended to go to war over impressment, but had found
itself in the situation during the War of 1812 quite by
accident.

The majority of the members of the United States

government were unwilling to make that mistake again.
Given this it is almost humorous that at this point
Britain seemed finally to have a change of heart.

Lord

Liverpool, First Lord of the Treasury, feared that Britain
would "never be engaged in a Maritime War with any Power
without its leading to a war with the United States."
Still the Lord could see no acceptable substitute for
"detention" as impressment was now called.

America had "to

admit the power of Detention under any circumstances."

On

this he felt "the Success of any Negotiation will dependo " 12
This was a rather unlikely thing to expect to happen, and
the British knew it.

The Earl Bathurst, Secretary of State

for War and Colonies was sure that impressment would once
again lead to war:
After what has passed the U. States cannot
submit to the exercise of this right.
It must
predispose them against us in every War in
which we shall be engaged, and it ensures to
every European State, a certain Ally, in their
hostility against us. 13
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Despite these fears the situation remained unchanged until
1818.
On April 18, 1818, Richard Rush, the new envoy to
Great Britain, on orders from Secretary of state John
Quincy Adams, offered once more to exclude from United
States service "all British subjects or seamen now in the
United States ... not heretofore naturalized" in return for
renunciation of impressment at sea. 14

Unbeknownst to the

Americans, Lord Castlereagh already had cabinet approval
for the plan.

He had previously told them that impressment

was "the Question of all others between the two Governments
which has most operated to exasperate."

If this agreement

got Americans "to give adequate effect to their own
policy ... Gt. Britain will have not only gained her main
object, but escape the danger of an American War. " 15

It

seemed that the long and costly debate over impressment was
finally at an end.

Castlereagh revealed his cabinet

approval, and, almost unbelievably, America remained
unmoved. 16
Why?

Castlereagh had suggested that:

the reserve which the United States would require
in favor of British subjects already Naturalized
might be guarded by requiring a List of all
Persons so claiming to be furnished within a
time to be limited. 17
This was exactly the kind of paperwork the States had been
shying away from for years.

The American administration

refused Castlereagh's offer using the old argument that it
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might endanger sailors who could accidentally be omitted.
"Upon impressment we have again completely failed."
Richard Rush reported to ex-President Madison.

"I fear

sir, that it will only be left to some future
administration to follow ... the precedent of a remedy which
you were forced at last to set. " 18

The negotiations then

foundered and were soon after called off.
With this impressment virtually vanished from the
diplomacy of the two countries, though it continued in
practice.

No future administration ever did follow

Madison's path.

America, it seems, after long argument and

even armed combat, had finally learned to live with
impressment.
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